ISSUES OF SOCIAL class are probably more important in Britain than in any other comparable society. The experience of "class" is sharpest at the workplace, where labour interests are usually represented by trade unions. Why then has trade unionism appeared to be so important in die post-war period, yet also largely ineffectual, in terms of creating fundamental changes in die economic and political position of labour? The growth of shop steward organization, with a doubling of die number of workplace representatives, was dramatic in the 1960s, and with sit-ins and workplace occupations challenging die rights of capital in die early 1970s, this high profile for trade unions continued. Trade unionism appeared to be squeezing profits and hastening capitalistic crisis; and it seemed to be organizationally capable of challenging company investment, location, and production policies. These developments suggested diat die contradictory nature of trade unionism, its opposition to and yet dependence upon capitalism, might create a kind of "dual power" in die workplace which eventually could replace capital's control with workers' control During diese decades workers' occupations and workers' alternative plans emerged to challenge die property rights and purposes of capitalist production. Although this clearly was a minority experience and practice it appeared nonetheless that a new, more challenging trade unionism was in die making. 
Some of these issues have been part of the analysis of trade unions from the outset For example, Marx and Engels in their early writing considered unions to be agents of change -a kind of socialist training ground for the working class. Later, they and other writers cast doubt on this potential and tended to be more dismissive of the union challenge.
3 Furthermore, despite the extensive discussion and analysis of die position of trade unions within capitalism, much of this theoretical writing has led to an overly-deterministic and static view of trade unionism and has underplayed, even ignored, workplace unionism and die importance of individual and collective human "intervention" in die historical process.
No one would doubt die importance of die post-war years for understanding die nature and development of die British trade union movement This opens die possibility of new perspectives and analysis, and central to this must be an evaluation of die role of die relatively modern phenomenon of specifically workplace trade unionism.
The Emergence ofShopfloor Power
THE WARTIME PERIOD is generally considered to have been one of consensus, of British society pulling together to defeat die common enemy. For workers at home diis was not always so clear-cut: some were directed away from home and found their labour exploited by war contractors. The official statistics record little unemployment, but some workers did endure periods of joblessness and social abuse for not contributing to die war effort Outers worked on contracts which were starved of proper resources, and engaged in protest over working arrangements. Some groups of workers with local bargaining power (because of die war) used it to improve terms and conditions in spite of strikes being declared illegal. At an organizational level, workers in different sites and work-places made contacts and sat on production committees (later "consultative committees"); workers' confidence was built and managerial (and ministerial) decision-making were challenged. 4 The continuity between production committees, "consultative committees," and, later, post-war site bargaining, may have been overstated by early commens For a discussion of the issues raised in mis paragraph, see R. Hyman, Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism (London 1971). 4 These comments are partly based on my father's records. He experienced both unemployment and social abuse (on one occasion being set upon by an old lady swinging her handbag demanding to know why he was not "at the front"). He also took part in protest stoppages at Kirkby munitions depot and slept in the bed being installed for the Duke of York during one all-night "sit-in" strike on board a ship. tators, 3 but the example of workers challenging management authority was certainly a stimulus to plant-level negotiation. The ideas that life would be different after the war, and that mass unemployment and the workhouse would be gone forever, were linked to the importance of everyone contributing to win the war. For some spokespersons of industry and commerce and for some in the Conservative Party, this post-war concern about workers may have been mere rhetoric, but there was sufficient general concern to provide large-scale support for the consensus pontics of Beveridge and Keynes, namely for an expanded welfare state and full employment'
The British Labour Party, founded and supported by the trade unions, farmed its first majority government in 1945, but the Labour Party's vision of support and protection "from the cradle to the grave** did not provide a leading role for ordinary trade unionists in the new society, for it did not seek to establish effective workers' control. When Aneurian (Nye) Bevan, a standard-bearer for die left and the Minister responsible for introducing die National Health Service, talked about problems in the mines after nationalization, be lectured the miners on the need to increase production, and about their failure to see how their status had changed, meanwhile, from worker to owner. He did not address himself to the changes required to introduce a worker-controlled structure for the industry. The advance from stale ownership to full socialism is in direct proportion to the extent the workers in the nationalized sector are made aware of a changed relationship between themselves and the management. The persistence of a sense of dualism in a publicly owned industry is evidence of an immature industrial democracy. It means that emotionally the "management" is still associated with the conception of alien ownership, and the "workers'' are still "hands." Until we make the cross-over to a spirit of co-operation, the latent energies of democratic participation cannot be fully released..." Not once in his chapter "The Transition to Socialism "does he discuss structures for workers ' This conflict between wage and salary demands and government attempts to control incomes in pursuit of increased profitability (and in turn investment and growth) became a recurring post-war theme. It illustrated both the frailty and complexity of the link between the party and unions, as well as the limitations of post-war "labourism," which sought to meet workers' demands by seeking reforms within capitalism. This often led Labour governments to seek union cooperation to limit pay claims as die preferred method of funding industrial reinvestment. An alternative view might emphasize mat die Labour leadership saw its role as introducing democratic socialism through parliamentary reforms, which although a compromise with capital did have benefits for workers.
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Labour governments could strike deals at die national level, but over time immediate trade-union membership demands, articulated through growing shop steward activity, reasserted themselves. In many cases shopfloor workers pushed national union leaderships to give official support to the claims.
10 From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, mis pressure from below did not prevent .some union leaders from denouncing lay officials, or from trying to break steward control in die docks, shipbuilding, and the motor trade (as shown by die break-up of die powerful Ford Dagenham combine shop steward committee in 1960).
In die late 1950s and early 1960s, in response to economic conditions and labour shortages, shop steward organization and power grew not only in these traditional industries, but also in die engineering and newer manufacturing industries. Ahhough trade union concerns were sectional and focused mainly on pay and conditions, die growdi of labour organization nevertheless was increasingly seen TRADE UNIONISM, WORKPLACE AND POLITICS 193 to threaten managerial power and, later, economic recovery. 11 However, no major political initiatives were taken to restrict the growth of local trade unionism, although limits to public sector trade unionism and ballots before strikes were considered bom by Labour and Conservative governments from die late 1940s to the early 1960s.
At The concern of die government to modernize industry -"die white heat of die technological revolution,'' as Harold Wilson expressed it -together with "indicative" National Plans, 13 led to some improvements in working conditions, "One analysis of workplace strike activity concluded that only one quarter of strikes were concerned directly with pay (compared with two-thirds before the war), and the majority were about the "use" of labour-control issues. Turner, Trend of Strikes (Leeds 1963).
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These cases marked out the areas of law which could be changed by statute-for instance, secondary action. See also Inns of Court Conservative Society, A Giant's Strength (London 1958).
13
The National Plan laid down guidelines on objectives to be achieved through industry committees of NEDC, but it had no mechanism to achieve mis planning (mat is, actual government intervention in companies' activities). Hence, "indicative," not actual.
but not in radical change in Britain's economy, or in labour's socioeconomic position. The government, restricted by the international role of sterling, found it impossible to break out of the cycle of "stop-go" policies, and increasingly blamed the wage demands of shopfloor trade unionists for its own failures.
14 "Wildcat" strikes, "restrictive practices," and "unearned" wage demands all were alleged to contribute to the "problem" of industrial relations.
The dominant view that inflation was caused by "cost push" led to demands for a wages policy and to the "scapegoating" of trade unions. In die 1966 Seamen's Strike, for example, Wilson denounced those involved "as a tightly-knit group of politically motivated men," rather than seeing them as a group of workers with legitimate grievances. Wage restraint became a major plank of Labour government policy; productivity agreements were championed as a way of funding industry while simultaneously recognizing die power of shopfloor organization to maintain real incomes above any nationally agreed-upon pay levels.
to 1979: Donovan and the period of pluralism
THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT considered legal sanctions as a means of restricting strikes and other "disruptive" action. The Government had no quarrel with national trade union leaders, but felt compelled to curb the growth of shopfloor power and considered that such action might strengthen national union leaders' control over their more-militant members.
The Donovan Commission, set up in 196S, reported in 1968 but did not recommend legal sanctions against "unofficial" action. However, the government was so wedded to its original position that the minister responsible, Barbara Castle, produced a White Paper, "In Place of Strife," calling for ballots before strike action. This split both the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party, and was
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The Labour government believed it could achieve growth by using Keynesian demandmanagement policies. The intent was to run a budget deficit to boost domestic demand and stimulate confidence in industry; supply is slower to respond, and in practice the increased demand would first push up prices and attract imports. This could be tolerated for a while, but just as the results in terms of investment and increased production were beginning to show, an unfavourable balance of payments would cause a run on the pound, interest rates would be pushed up to defend sterling, and the domestic-investment side would stall. The structural problems facing Western countries thus were accentuated in the UK because of the international role of sterling. The resulting price increases were followed by wage demands, and the end result, was an inflated but not an expanded economy. Labour governments would have liked to "prevent" the international speculators and wished industry had invested sooner (Wilson complained of both the "Gnomes of Zurich" and the "strike of capital"), but in practice could act only to keep wages down. withdrawn at the insistence of the Trades Union Congress in exchange for a TUC statement of intent to monitor trade union activity.
Why did the Donovan Commission not support the politicians' view that further constraints needed to be placed on unions? Those involved in the Commission's work had a much clearer picture than the Government of what was happening in industry. Academic research had begun to monitor workplace industrial relations; indeed "industrial relations*' was beginning to be accepted as an academic discipline. The growth of shopfloor organization and bargaining had been documented in the automobile industry and elsewhere, and the Esso Fawley productivity agreements (1960-1968) were being analyzed. 13 The quality of the new research was demonstrated in the Commission's research papers. Many of diem rejected a "unitarist" framework for understanding industrial relations (managers and workers working for die same ends) which was explicitly accepted or implied in many Labour and Conservative politicians' speeches. It was replaced by a "pluralist" view of workplace relations, which accepted die different goals of départies to iiniustrialrelatiora and therefore recogi^ union shopfloor organization. Whichever view of the troubled 1974-9 Labour government is adopted, analysis nevertheless centres around its relationship with the trade union movement But negotiations between government and union leaders did not take place in isolation from developments in workplace industrial relations which underwent considerable change during the 1970s.
Although this period is often depicted as the high point of trade union power and influence at the national level, and of workplace trade unionism at the local level, the union militancy of the Heath period of 1970-74 had in fact subsided, and the Labour government was left with little pressure from below, particularly in 1975-77. There was a growth in trade-union membership and in shopfloor organization, but workers' demands, which had appeared so important in relation to the profits squeeze, 37 jobs, and opposition to legislation, were diverted; activity centred on finding ways around pay controls, and on new areas like health and safety. The period illustrates most clearly the contradictions of labourism from a trade unionist or working-class viewpoint. The union/Labour Party link was used by a Labour government to discipline workers and restrain wage demands; in return it offered reforms which could only be delivered if the economy recovered at the expense of workers'incomes. 3 * In general, the labour movement put little pressure on the Labour government and many activists, although complaining about wage constraint, did little to formulate alternative demands, partly reflecting their own acceptance of the limits of union action and of the social democratic/reformist ideology. Many trade unionists believed that the "social contract" type of deal was a real socialist advance, a compromise, maybe, but one associated with useful social reforms. The ideas for alternative economic policies generally had not involved shop-floor trade unionists, although the example of the Lucas alternative workers' plans was available and did prompt a few responses. 39 Benn had been assigned the energy portfolio, and now invited the miners to submit plans for democratic control and management of their industry, but this approach met with no response. Leftist leaders in the industry saw it as a distraction from collective bargaining and a national plan for coal, fearing that any scheme for "involvement'' in management would compromise union independence and bring accommodation with management plans. This reflected a political view that reform from within was impossible, and that therefore the role for radical unions was simple opposition.
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There were a few attempts to involve "workers on the board,'' but the potential of the Bullock committee proposals, which included promoting joint shop-steward 27 combine committees, was never fully explored by the Labour government or the trade union movement. Many in the official union organization were worried that such a development would be outside their control. Few proposals were formulated to influence investment, location or product mix. The Lucas type of initiative was applauded but not actively supported by the new Industry Ministers. One Minister, Gerald Kaufman, said the proposals were "a refreshing change''and described the union combine as a "constructive group of trade unionists."" On another occasion at Lucas on Merseyside, government loans and grants were made contingent on management considering the plan, but die company was not compelled to respond.
While it can be argued that shopfloor trade unionism raised few "socialist" demands, it must also be recalled that the Labour government failed to deliver on some key trade union demands. The extension of the Ports Scheme to other smaller ports outside of the legally-recognized national agreement (which was a form of industrial democracy, giving recognition and bargaining rights to registered dockers), for example, had only lukewarm support in cabinet, was misunderstood by MPs and others in the party , M and was to be a crucial weakness of unionism in the Thatcher years.
The 1970s have to be a further shift toward state intervention which it regarded as ideologically unacceptable. Rising unemployment and inflation meant that a choice would have to be made -either more state intervention in managing the economy, or more freedom for private capital. Control of inflation was declared the only legitimate economic policy for government to follow, and control of the money supply the only legitimate economic tool. The economy had to be freed from 'excessive' public-sector demands, and from monopoly labour power in order to regenerate itself. Thus, the economy was deliberately stalled, the tax-base shifted in part from direct to indirect taxation, and die public sector restricted and progressively privatized. Union "privileges'' were to be withdrawn in an attempt to restrict and "depoliticize" the trade union movement Welfare benefits were to be cut back.
This package was presented as the "only way forward" for the British economy ("there is no alternative"), and unions were told they had to operate in this environment The government made it clear that it would not bail out industries or intervene to settle disputes.
The logic or consistency of these policies need not concern us here. In this context what is important is the impact they had on union organization. Unemployment rose rapidly; the government refused, not surprisingly, to yield to steelworkers (on pay and jobs) and to TUC days of protest against rising joblessness and the new employment legislation. The new situation was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the government's resistance to civil servants' wage claims. Agreements were disregarded, arbitration was refused, and the government expended considerable resources fighting and refusing to compromise on the claims. In this harsher climate, with millions on the dole, the government claimed that it did not have to pay more to attract job applicants -it needed only to pay the "market*' price.
Despite some significant protests against government policies, with public opinion swinging away from the government (opinion polls showed majority support for Labour), public support swung back again during the jingoistic Falklands war campaign which carried the government through to a second term of office in 1983.
The TUC and individual unions had been reluctant to engage with the government and felt constrained by minority support among trade unionists for the Labour opposition. The new industrial relations legislation, with its populist assumptions of "giving the unions back to the members'' and "curbing excessive union power," was both more subtle and difficult to argue against than that of the previous Conservative government As a result the TUC General Council opted for the "new realism" of a less-oppositional or less-confrontational approach to the government Part of the problem for the TUC, and for the labour movement as a whole, was the success of the Thatcher government's propaganda: union members had accepted many of the arguments about union power and about there being no alternative to Tory economic policies. This message was part of the ruling idea of the time-the hegemony of capitalist ideology spelt out as "common sense." The TUC and Labour leadership in general were neither disposed nor able to challenge the government even if they had wanted to. The "new realism*' held that unions had to accept tbe legitimacy of tbe (Thatcher) government and the rule of law. Unions would have to live with the new economic and political climate, and if they snowed themselves to be "responsible," they might succeed in influencing some policies, pending tbe return of a Labour government.
The government, for its part, showed no intention of moderating its policies. The decision to outlaw union membership at General Command Headquarters (GCHQ), a civil service-run monitoring service, despite union offers of no-strike agreements and condemnation by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), illustrated die weakness of the TUC's position. Tbe TUC failure to support ASLEFs attempt to defend manning and working practices on the railways and to assist the NGA dispute at Warrington over union membership were not rewarded by any Government concessions at GCHQ. These public defeats set the scene for the 1984-85 confrontation with die miners.
At the workplace-level, trade union organization was railing to cope with the new political and economic environment The heartland of post-war workplace unionism, tbe motor and components industry, declined from 1.2 million to400,000 workers in ten years. Shop stewards and members were ill-prepared for die shift to more authoritarian management which emphasized employer prerogatives, contesting negotiated procedures and practices. Perhaps die most overt example of die failure of steward organization was at British Leyland and in particular the sacking of Longbridge convenor Derek Robinson.* 3 Some recent evidence has suggested that die changed conditions of die 1980s have had less impact on shop steward organization than usually has been assumed. It may be die case, also, that emphasis on die political and economic climate, together wim die attention directed at die role of management in "sponsoring" and "fostering" union organization for management's own ends, has partly overshadowed die ability of workplace organization to mount resistance during die recession. There is some evidence to show diat less insular, more active, "politically-aware" and involved organizations have been able to draw on organizational resources and membership support to force management to consider alternative ways of responding to market forces. 34 Nonetheless, die general view of reduced workplace union confidence predominates. The strongest challenge, particularly at the national level, to these government policies has come from public sector unions. The shift of union militancy from the private to the public sector can certainly be traced back to the 1970s, if not to the 1960s, and mainly reflects the concentration of incomes policies upon public sector workers. In die Thatcher period, this has been even more marked because of die absence of a formal incomes policy, co-existing widi the reality of public-sector wage and salary restraints coupled with attacks on public services themselves. The cuts and privatization of services, together with attempts to break up established pay agreements by introducing regional differentials and incentives instead of nation-wide agreements, have brought public sector workers into the front line.
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The 1984-85 Miners' Strike deserves separate consideration, 36 given the important place miners occupy in working-class politics and culture, and die importance attached to their strike both it by government and die labour movement as a key to die future orientation of industrial policy. The miners' victories of 1972 and 1974 were regarded by die miners as "repayment'' for their defeat in die 1926 General Strike, and gave a considerable boost to working-class and trade union confidence. The defeat of 1984-85, ahhough remembered by many "as a heroic struggle for a just cause," had die reverse effect of very severely denting union confidence and in effect, destroying die NUM as a major element of die labour movement (membership declined precipitously from 200,000 to less dian 100,000).
No doubt die government expected die defeat of die miners to discourage all odier union militancy, but die activity of teachers and nurses unions in die mid-1980s and die resurgence of union militancy in 1989-90, including that ambulance crews, serves to remind us tiiat, where grievances exist, even die least-militant trade unionists are prepared to undertake industrial action if no other course appears to be open to diem.
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The Miners' Strike affected workers' consciousness in a number of ways. It heightened class consciousness for some, particularly those most directly involved. This resulted in die rapid growth of political affiliations in die coalfields, and was perhaps most spectacularly seen in die important role played by women during die dispute. Conversely, however, die strike also served to fragment working-class solidarity. Many miners, especially diose in die large Nottingham coalfield, remained at work. Their example was followed by power workers and some steelworkers. The defeat of the strike represented a major defeat for radical unionism and a major victory for Thatcherism. However, the setback was not absolute. The resurgence of trade union strike activity, particularly in the public sector, and the success of wage claims in the private sector, during summer 1989, indicate the persistence of trade unions as bargaining agents, although such developments also point, perhaps, to the unions' dependence for success upon the late 1980s' tighter labour markets.
White-Collar, Black, and Women Workers
THROUGHOUT THE POST-WAR PERIOD, there has been both an actual and proportkmal growth in white-collar and professional trade unionism. These workers with few trade union traditions have been characterized as less committed to trade union activity than manual workers. However, a number of writers have suggested that within this group lies a "new working class." They have focused on the impact of new technology, the restrictions to individual "career" or even job satisfaction within large organizations, and the role played by some white-collar workers in resisting plant closures.
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' This new working class is seen as potentially more radical than manual workers, because it is more self-conscious and ambitious in its demands, and seeks to control more and more of its working environment It is worth noting that it is when technical and administrative staff have joined with manual workers that some of the more innovative challenges have been made to management -for example, the Lucas Combine Committee's Workers' Plans. But it is not clear whether many of these newer trade unionists see themselves as "radicals," and while there may be potential to develop increasing class consciousness, this "new working class" has not yet done so." Also, in the late 1980s, the union movement has struggled to retain these groups in the face of sophisticated management techniques involving individualized benefits packages.
There has also been a growth in female membership of trade unions, accounted for in part by the shift away from manufacturing industry to the service sector. Traditionally, women members have not been aggressive negotiators over pay, and many male trade unionists regard their presence as a dilution of militancy. 40 On the other hand, women have been very active in defending jobs, be it at Lee Jeans in Greenock (1981) or in the National Health Service (NHS) fighting privatization and closure, particularly in the mid-1980s. Male workers, for example, at the Scottish motor plants, sometimes have proved to be less prepared to fight for jobs than some groups of women, thus challenging the traditional view of women as a brake on union militancy. There also is the recent example of women organizing during the Miners' Strike. Here, initial involvement was largely in traditional "servicing" areas-food kitchens, parcels, jumble sales-but this developed into speaking at meetings (often male-dominated), joining with other women, claiming the right to attend evening meetings and to join picket lines. Their subsequent claim for associate-member status within the NUM, although rejected, represented a challenge in the heartland of traditional male manual trade unionism.
Some unions are changing -witness the National Union of Public Employees'(NUPE) 198S National Executive elections resulting in 11 out of 26 seats going to women, and the TUC's 1989 decision to increase the number of seats reserved for women on its General Council. There is still a long way to go, however, before male dominance in the British labour movement will be eradicated. 41 Until trade unionists become more receptive to women's demands, and more ready to accommodate women's needs, the radical potential of the unions will be limited. all their membership until they can organize to combat this discrimination and take seriously the demands of black workers. The British Labour leadership's agonizing over Mack sections is a contemporary example of the labour movement's insensitivity to such demands, as well as the dilemma posed by separatism.
Understanding Post-War Trade Unionism
THIS HBTORICALSKETCH needs to be set against an understanding of post-war trade unionism. The examination will range across a number of issues including consciousness, bureaucratization, and sectionalism; it also will consider some specific questions raised by other case-study evidence. This will be followed by a discussion of the relative decline of trade unionism in the 1980s. The British experience since the war has had a particularly sobering effect on this view. Huw Beynon's study of the Merseyside Ford workers (regarded as amongst the most militant of British workers) showed how union consciousness, in its opposition to management authority, was more an example of "factory" rather than "class" consciousness. It extended to other workers within the plant but rarely beyond the factory gate. 43 Beynon and Nichols' later study of ICI workers looked at how workers were divided by working conditions, shift patterns, and management policies, and illustrated the divorce between union membership and union consciousness, let alone class-consciousness. This view is supported by noting how unions failed generally to negotiate on the key management prerogatives of investment, location, product mix, and plant or service closure. There is also some evidence to show that management adopted sophisticated policies to incorporate unions at the plant level and to exclude unions from corporate management decisions.
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This view ignores, however, some of the sources of union strength and independence. Many employers assented to union demands only after initial struggle, and adopted sponsorship or incorporatist strategies only when these appeared to be a more cost-effective option than outright opposition. 30 Secondly, once established, even a "sponsored" workplace organization can develop a broader union consciousness than management (or die official union) had intended and can initiate independent action. Sometimes this results from loyalty to a national union or labour movement struggle outside the plant. The sponsorship and incorporatist critiques of workplace unionism, therefore, should be regarded as explaining only partially, at best, the experience of the 1960s and 1970s: they were important tendencies but not determinants.
A further development of the incorporatist critique of workplace unionism is the charge that lay officials at local level have been subject to "bureaucratization." This is not to suggest that they have acquired all the advantages of operating as key members of a bureaucratic organization, but rather that they tend towards accepting a bureaucratic way of operating. Unions tend to generate "processes" which can restrict spontaneity and stifle membership demands: for example, an insistence on adhering to grievance or disciplinary procedures or other written agreements when dealing with management This tendency, supported by increasing legalism, can work against immediacy and channel grievances into the annual negotiations. Thus, officials at the local level can become just as remote as officials at higher levels. Of course, discipline is an important ingredient of effective trade unionism, but there is the danger that the means can overlook the end in emphasis and objective.
This argument has been used to suggest that today there exists "a complex system of linkages between the relatively inactive membership on the shop-floor (or office floor) and the top leadership in the TUC Economic Committee.** 31 It is claimed that this explains the ability of national leaders to win membership consent for policies, such as incomes policies, which are against members' immediate interests. If this is true, it also begins to explain why the potential of "independent'' or "unofficial" shop steward organization has not developed as some might have predicted. The Donovan strategy may have succeeded to some degree by encouraging more managers to institutionalise workplace unionism and even more so by getting union structures to open up to lay activists and incorporate the local leadership, thus bringing the "two systems" of industrial relations closer together. This is a complex relationship, however, and while workplace organizations can still be regarded as centres of "workers' self-activity," relatively distinct from both management and official union organization, large-scale challenges to companies, industries, and the state do seem to require support from official channels beyond the resources of an "unofficial" movement acting alone. (It is also interesting that in the recession, the phrase "wild-cat settlements" has been used to describe workplace organizations which have gone against union policy, as well as agreedupon redundancies and job losses in return for pay rises, etc.).
Therefore, while such claims of incorporation can be overstated, perhaps they do help to explain, in part, why the increase in trade-union membership and activity at local level did not generate the kind of challenges that might have been predicted in the 1960s or early 1970s. A further explanation has been the continued sectionalism of trade union activity. "Hyman, "Politics." Sectionalism TRADE-UNION SECTIONALISM has its ideological roots in the origins of unionism in the 18th and 19m centuries. However, it can be understood today in different ways: the pursuit of the interests of one union in isolation and at the expense of others; or craft workers against unskilled; or white-collar against blue; or workers in one industry or service against those in others. These occupational divisions can also mask divisions of gender or race, and those in employment against those not in employment In other words, all the divisions which afflict the working class can be and are represented within trade unionism and can deepen existing splits within the working class.
Sectional concerns need not be a purely negative force. Sectional interests within union or workplace membership can, for example, allow minorities, who could otherwise be suppressed by trade-union ideology ("the need for unity," "majority rule"), to surface, for example, witness the Ford women sewing machinists. Also, sectional demands are difficult for management and the state to control; they often spring up outside the remit of the TUC or union General Secretaries and can sometimes clear a way for more general union demands. On this analysis, success for one group can mean some progress for all.
Generally, though, sectionalism is a regressive force, promoting the interests of the few rather than the many. Will Paynter, the former national president of the NUM. interviewed by Tony Lane, highlighted his reservations, as a socialist, about the shift to workplace bargaining. He argued that whether or not workplace bargaining was successfully "managed" by employers, it nonetheless promoted only sectional and not class concerns. A concentration on workplace problems may serve the members' immediate interests but does little to change their objective circumstances. A layer of new activists may have been created, he argued, but their energy has been diverted from political and industrial policy demands. A national union with nationally-relevant objectives is more politically significant.
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Paynter overstated his case, because workplace bargaining does not inevitably exclude a concern with national issues or the demands of the national union, and in any case is an avenue for workers' self-activity that does not rely on national union initiatives. A good, active, and largely-successful local organization may be a prerequisite for membership activity, particularly in a situation where traditional union or class loyalties cannot be relied upon. The danger of sectionalism, represented through workplace bargaining, is that it increases the possibility of workplace trade unionism being absorbed economically and politically, but workplace trade unionism does not have to be considered as inevitably sectional; it could be linked to broader structures and concerns. Left genre, were looking for evidence of independent working-class organization and activity, then rapport between workplace leaders (shop stewards) and their shop-floor members was heralded as a "rebirth" of trade union democracy: a democracy grounded on the instant accountability of the steward, and on policies which were determined in discussion with the membership. It is interesting to note that some of the early debates focused on the need to increase steward-training in order to ensure that stewards understood union policy and were able to play a role within workplace bargaining that was responsible and responsive to the needs both of management and of the national union.
57 Also, some commentators, such as Roberts, pointed to the unofficial strike as an example of the breakdown in union democracy, an illustration of the failure of agreed-upon national policies and elected national leadership to influence local events. These views have been substantially rejected in later works which see strikes as a reflection of workers' self-activity, and of the growth and potential of workers' control. Whatever die impact of changing political ideology, one tiling remains clear die extent of decline in union members depends in part on die continued failure of die unions to penetrate new areas of employment and to unionize die more peripheral workforce-part-timers, temporary staff, contract workers, and omers. The failure of unions to achieve tiiis cannot be taken for granted: for example, even better-paid workers in die new technology industries are selling their "labour power," as indeed are professionals and managers, so it is not inevitable that diey be non-unionists. The evidence to date of union penetration into these new industries and services is somewhat contradictory, but even if it is accepted that union density is significantly lower tiian it is for comparable firms in traditional industry, it is not totally absent For example, a survey of die North West, which underlines die trend away from unions, reports that just under SO per cent of such new technology companies are unionized.** There will be problems for unions in recruiting low-paid, temporary, and part-time workers, but not all die trends are against unionization: die creation of hyper-markets, for example, may bring togedier 100 or more workers, and so make it easier to recruit and activate these distribution workers than was possible previously with more-traditional, dispersed oudets.
Therefore, although some of die basic tenets of this argument must be accepted -for instance, changes in die nature of work and in die composition of die working class pose problems for trade unions and, indeed, for die political representation of labour -die outcome is neither uniform nor determined, but will depend in part on how die labour movement responds. Even die 1987 election-result with its low However, if there is to be a resurgence of trade unionism, in addition union members and activists in the workplace will need to combine to make demands on official union organization and link together to press workplace concerns. And if socialist ideas are to grow among trade unionists, there is also a need to rekindle the vision of "socialist" society envisaged in most union rule books and in the Labour Party constitution. per cent of the non-agricultural workforce unionized, are close in density to that of the UK -and significantly different from the position in the USA (17 per cent). The changes in the structure of the workforce, and of union membership, in Canada also bear comparison with die growth in female workers resulting in approximately 36 per cent of trade unionists in both countries being female.
Conclusions and Inferences for Canadian Unionism

THE
Trade union organisation in Canada and Britain is often grouped with mat in the US A, and similarities between the labour movement in all tiiree countries have been perceived (unitary central structure, emphasis on collective bargaining, strike activity, and so on)." 7 More recently however, a distinction has been drawn between developments in the UK and in the US particularly in relation to the decline in trade-union membership. This difference has often overshadowed enduring similarities between Britain and Canada, and the importance of looking at developments in these two countries before attempting an analysis of decline. For example, Richard Hyman's 1989 revised version of his "Class Struggle and the Trade Union Movement"" comments that British unionization of the workforce "is more than double die rate in North America.'' What this comment overlooks is that unions in Canada are different from die US in terms of union density, public sector unions with considerable white-collar and professional union memberships, and perhaps a clearer over-arching commitment to something more than business unionism.
The understanding of the nature of workplace trade unionism put forward here may appear to be more specific to die UK, but nonetheless die parameters of die arguments about bureaucratisation, incorporation, sectionalism, and management sponsorship are common to bom Canada and Britain. The dichotomy between business unionism and more radical unionism may, in part, take a different guise wim international unions vs national unions, but die debates have, if anything, been around in Canada longer. Bob White of die Canadian Autoworkers prefers die phrase "social unionism," while his UK counterpart, Ron Todd of die TGWU, uses "new unionism" to recall die unions radical beginnings; bow would deny dieir organizations are simply "business unions." Although arguments about union decline have particular piquancy for die UK, with more than 10 per cent loss of union membership recorded, diey also apply in Canada where unions face problems posed by die impact of free trade, and by die reduction and privatization of public services.
What inferences can be drawn from UK experience to aid Canadian unionism? The most important might appear to be rather dismal, but ought to be drawn nonetheless, and is that, despite fifteen years of post-war Labour government, die two trade union organisations are in a remarkably similar position. Politically, working for a federal government favourable to labour may be very time-consuming and disarming (resulting in wait-and-see tactics) and might result only in limited gains. Union political activity has to be more broadly-based, linking with other social movements and campaigns, and industrial action should not be constrained, perhaps, by worrying about the electoral impact of strike activity on political partners. To some extent, Canadian unions are already doing these things, so the inference should be to carry on, and do more of it, and UK unions could learn from Canadian experience.
The post-war experience of trade unionists in Britain and Canada has been an important factor in working-class life and politics. Unions have presented some dramatic challenges, at work and to the state, since the war, indeed, they occasionally have been credited with bringing down governments. Deeper analysis might reveal that union resistance, particularly in the workplace, most often has been a reaction to post-war economic crisis, the failures of labourism, and the seemingly inherent impossibility of achieving reformist aims and objectives.
9
The experience for trade unionists obviously has been keenest at the workplace, and one of the enduring feature of British trade unionism during this period has been the growth and influence of workplace trade unionism, along with the rise of national unions in Canada.
Contrary to a popular view that economic prosperity would defuse class antagonisms, the emergence of the "affluent worker," of trade unionists with an instrumental view of both work and of their unions, coincided with (some would say contributed to) a high level of workplace union-militancy but a decline in political radicalism. 70 This workplace trade unionism, in turn, has immersed workers in collective actions which have reinforced "class" experience, at least at die level of recognising their role as "labour" in the production process. The explanation, both for die activity of the late 1960s/1970s and the comparative reduction in strike activity of the mid-1980s, might be dus heightened "economic consciousness" of workers, which also can result in well-paid sections (in either country) voting for a tax-cutting Conservative government It would be quite wrong to claim that the experience charted in this article supports only a particular and specific set of conclusions. What it does indicate is Uiat even among die most organized, active, and aware sections of British trade unions whether private-or public sector diere is a feeling that little has changed in die post-war period in their position as "labour," it might also indicate that some are abandoning die idea that it ever can change, and perhaps are buying shares in privatized companies. To some extent, they have become more self-confident witiiin die workplace, more involved in their immediate working environment, but have lost faith in die capacity of working-class politics to change dungs. To this extent tiiey are more entrenched in capitalist relations, and arguably closer to die position of Canadian trade unionists. For many of those involved, any call for a "new radical unionism," and dierefore their renewed activity and sacrifice, would bave to be associated with a demand for a new "socialist" politics-a promise of a real stake in society, of workers' ownership and control. To succeed, it would have to include all sections of the working class, and promise an end to their treatment simply as "labour" in the processes of capitalist production, distribution, and exchange. To abandon socialist objectives now is to condemn present and future generations of workers to an endless organizational struggle within, rather than against, capitalism; to a repetition of post-war experience, and therefore to a trade unionism and a workplace democracy which can at best be described as "a permanent opposition never a government."
71
In this situation, it has become common both in Canadian and British labour movements to call for a new vision, one that takes account of developments in Eastern Europe, the Third World, and the environment 72 It is difficult to sustain such an all-embracing notion of a just society in the 1990s, but it is crucial that workers' organizations continue to seek alternative, kss-atienatrng means of production. They should celebrate successes, no matter how small or localized, and keep alive the potential of workers' self-management for the 21st century. 
